

Ministry of Justice

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To the Speaker of the Lower House of the States
General
PO Box 20018
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Our reference 5358374/05/AJS

Appendices 1

Re. Policy memorandum on radicalism and
radicalisation

When responding to this
letter please state its date
and our reference. Please
address one issue only in
each item of
correspondence.

On behalf of the Government and further to my earlier promise, please find enclosed the policy memorandum on radicalism and radicalisation. This memorandum aims to clarify the ways in which radicalism and radicalisation constitute a threat to society and to the democratic legal order. The memorandum also provides a framework for the relevant Government policy.

The Minister of Justice,

Radicalism and radicalisation

1 Introduction

This memorandum was completed shortly after society was confronted with the terrorist attacks in London. This brought the threat of terrorism to the forefront once more and stresses the need for a broad vision in respect of dealing with radicalism and radicalisation. In extreme cases these phenomena can lead to terrorism. However, they must not be put on a par with terrorism, and combating them requires its own approach. It is this approach that the Government has been developing, the broad outlines of which are described here.

Radicalism is an attitude of mind. We use this term to indicate the preparedness to accept the extreme consequences of a philosophy and turn them into actions. These actions may result in situations where contrasts that - in themselves - are manageable, can escalate to a level at which they disrupt society. This may be because violence is involved, or because other behaviour is encouraged that deeply wounds people or affects their freedom, or because entire groups distance themselves from society. But at the same time we are also dealing with a philosophy, and in a multiform and free society like ours we want it to be possible for people to freely discuss their ideas. There are limits to what can be said, but overly severe restrictions affect the basis of the democratic legal order.

It is this dual risk that necessitates an adequate solution - a solution that provides an insight into renewed parameters and acceptance of the line between freedom and acceptable social multiformity on the one hand and unacceptable, intolerant radicalism on the other. But most of all, this risk necessitates a solution that creates room and parameters for everyone to obtain a place in society based on individual personality and origin, with respect and accountability for the place of others in the perspective of a joint future.

Such a solution cannot come from a single Minister, and not even from the Government in its entirety; ultimately, it must come from society as a whole. With this memorandum the Government gives an initial impulse in this direction. The phenomena of radicalism and radicalisation and the threat they pose are further analysed, and ways to combat them are considered. The memorandum therefore provides a basis for the relevant policy of individual Ministers. However, with this memorandum the Government also extends an invitation to society as a whole - to other Governments, to organisations, to communities and to individual citizens - to make a joint effort to maintain and develop an open, tolerant and relaxed society in which there are no breeding

grounds for radicalism, because everyone has the room to develop their full potential and can be secure in their own certainties and truths.

1.1 Antecedents and the relation to previously initiated policy and the role of local government

Certain aspects and elements of this memorandum were previously discussed in a different context. For instance, the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) memorandum entitled '*Van Dawa tot Jihad*' (From Dawa to Jihad) (Parliamentary documents II, 2004/05, 29 754, no. 4) contained a further analysis of the threat of Islamic radicalism and in 1998 its predecessor, the BVD (National Security Service), also drew attention to the phenomenon of radicalisation among young Moslems who let themselves be inspired by the Jihad. Other reports and annual reports of the AIVD and the BVD look at the threat posed by animal rights activism (among others: Parliamentary documents II, 2003/04, 29200 VI, no. 175 plus appendices) and left-wing and right-wing extremism (among others: AIVD 2003 annual report). The report entitled '*Nationaal Dreigingsbeeld zware of georganiseerde criminaliteit*' (National threat posed by serious or organised crime) published by the National Police Services Agency in July 2004 gives a side-on view of this threat. The legal framework for the theme of this memorandum can be found in the memorandum entitled '*Grondrechten in een pluriforme samenleving*' (Fundamental rights in a multiform society) (Parliamentary documents II, 2003/04, 29614); the Government response to the report entitled '*Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag*' (Values, norms and the problems associated with the behaviour) (Parliamentary documents II, 2003/04, 29 454, no. 2), published by the Advisory Council on Government Policy, provides a policy-based framework for dealing with deep-rooted ideas.

The Cabinet's policy is always characterised by a two-sided approach: embedding and mutual adaptation where possible, alertness and drastic action where necessary. For instance, after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the Cabinet presented the action plan '*Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*' (Combating Terrorism and National Security), which dealt with radicalisation. The Lower House was kept informed about the implementation of the measures from this plan by means of progress reports. The sixth and last report on the action plan '*Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*' was submitted to the Lower House on 27 June 2003. The Lower House is being kept informed about the implementation of the current anti-terrorism policy twice a year by means of a progress report.

After the terrorist attacks in Madrid, the Lower House once again requested attention for the threat of Islamic radicalism. In debates following on from statements by orthodox imams or from fundamentalist texts about, among

other issues, homosexuality or equality for men and women, the Cabinet was asked to investigate whether society is sufficiently able to protect the foundations of the social system against attacks - either verbal or physical - from radical or extremist groups in society.

In response to the concerns of the Lower House the letter dated 10 September (Parliamentary documents II, 2004/05, 29 74, no. 1) announced a memorandum about combating terrorism. The letter dated 10 November on the subject of the murder of Mr. Van Gogh (Parliamentary documents II, 2004/05, 29 854, no. 3) subsequently outlined the approach to dealing with Islamic radicalism. Together with the more specific memorandums from separate Ministers, this memorandum provides the promised further definition of this approach, but is also a broadening thereof. Islamic radicalism is not the only threat; right-wing radicalism and animal rights activism also manifest themselves in ways that require intervention.

With regard to an important element of the approach to dealing with radicalism and radicalisation, the Minister for Immigration and Integration has, meanwhile, submitted the memorandum entitled '*Weerbaarheid tegen radicalisation van moslimjongeren*' (Defences against the radicalisation of young Moslems) (Parliamentary documents II, 29800 VI, no. 117) to the Lower House. This memorandum looks at the strategy aimed at preventing Islamic radicalisation among young people, and outlines two concrete plans to increase the Moslem community's defences against radicalisation. In more general terms, the integration policy is an essential component of the policy for combating radicalism. To effectively turn the radicalisation tide that is linked to the presence of ethnic minorities, integration is required. Conversely, to effect this integration, the forms of radicalism that obstruct it must be combated effectively.

Combating radicalisation is, in practice, to a large extent a matter of the timely recognition of the manifestations of radicalism and a targeted approach to sources of potentially violent radicalisation. Dealing with radicalism and radicalisation is therefore an area where local and national government need each other and complement each other. Decentralised authorities must take the lead in recognising manifestations of radicalism, as they are best able to generate an accurate picture through their contacts with, among others, the local (ethnic) community and on the basis of information from, for instance, the police, Social Affairs, community centres and clubs, and educational institutes. Municipalities can be expected to take charge, on a local basis, of measures like establishing a system for the early recognition of manifestations of radicalism and the implementation of administrative measures to counteract radicalism and extremism. The preventative aspects of the approach and the connection to the local integration policy also deserve attention. In this context it is heartening to see that municipalities like

Amsterdam and Rotterdam have taken the initiative in the implementation of measures and policies with respect to tackling radicalisation at the local level. We refer to the memorandum entitled '*Meedoen of achterblijven*' (Join in or get left behind) published by the municipality of Rotterdam and the Amsterdam action plan entitled '*Wij Amsterdammers*' (We, the citizens of Amsterdam).

1.1 *Coordination*

The combating of radicalism and radicalisation requires efforts in a large number of policy areas. However, many of these efforts have a broader scope and must therefore not be primarily considered and evaluated from the point of view of combating radicalism and radicalisation. In summary, we can therefore say that central and local government should focus on three types of efforts: 1) reinforcing the bond of individuals and communities to society and to the democratic legal order, 2) promoting the assertiveness of society as a whole and of individuals and communities, and 3) decisive action against radicals and their supporters.

This memorandum is not intended as an exhaustive and detailed description of the policy in each of these areas. Its intention is merely to sketch a framework in which policies in different areas, and originating from different authorities, must be placed, to be able to be considered from the viewpoint of the campaign against radicalism and radicalisation. This provides additional direction, cohesion and justification for the policy of many authorities, without interference in their responsibilities. Within the Cabinet there will be further decision-making processes regarding the necessary coordination and synchronisation of the various initiatives and implementation in this area.

2 Radicalism and radicalisation: what is the problem?

What radicalism is, and in what circumstances it becomes necessary to act against it, is something that most people can understand. However, when it comes to the question whether, in a specific case, radicalism is involved and action is therefore necessary, it becomes clear there are many very different opinions on the subject. The discussions about the boundaries of freedom of speech that were recently held in both the media and in the Lower House - as a result of the terrorism letters and in the debate about the Fundamental Rights in a Multiform Society [*Grondrechten in de pluriforme samenleving*] memorandum - make this clear. These differences of opinion are partly based on the fact that the term 'radicalism' is used to indicate a broad spectrum of manifestations: from violence or the threat of violence to making pronouncements that conflict with broadly held views. However, the latter makes it possible to register a lot of things under the header of radicalism, and is therefore a cause of differences of opinion.

The introduction describes radicalism as the preparedness to accept the extreme consequences of a philosophy and turn them into actions. However, this in itself cannot be a reason to act against it. After all, there are circumstances in which such an attitude of mind is to be commended - in any case retrospectively. Not only the Dutch State as such, but also the democratic legal order in a broader sense and most of the political, social and philosophical convictions we currently hold owe their continued existence to individuals and larger groups that possessed this preparedness.

It is therefore the disruptive actions and the propagation of subversive ideas that cause radicalism to be such a problem that we need to take action against it. Below we will analyse in more detail when this is considered to be the case in the Netherlands in a general sense, and to what extent this is the case at present.

2.1 *The general threat*

The relevant context is provided by the fact that the Netherlands is a democratic constitutional state; in other words, a form of cohabitation in which differences of opinion and contrasting views are settled in a democratic manner - and therefore with due respect for the interests of the minority - and in which the Government guarantees the protection of individuals and respect for the rights of citizens. This immediately indicates which forms of radicalisation cannot be tolerated: those forms of radicalisation that negatively affect the safety or rights of citizens, and those forms where the realisation of changes are propagated in non-democratic ways, or where the principles concern changing the decision-making process in such a way that the interests

of minorities are no longer respected. In more concrete terms, therefore, we are talking about disruptive actions and subversive ideas.

2.1.1 Disruptive actions

The threat of radicalism is not primarily based on the philosophy, but on the expectation that this philosophy may, in practice, result in violence. After all, radicalism is characterised by thoughts and actions that are ruled by a controlling ideal, belief, objective or interest. The complex reality, social welfare and even the radical's own life become subordinate to this controlling idea. The uncompromising intolerance with which the implicit claims of superiority of the radical philosophy are broadcast can easily result in the denial of individual freedom - and sometimes even the right to exist - of those with other views.

The consequences of the willingness to use violence do not only lie in the direct threat they pose, but also in the effects of such threats. Murder and violence, and the radicalism that incite them, deservedly inspire fear, and shock the democratic legal order. However, they do not, in principle, affect the foundation of this legal order. Neither a terrorist attack with multiple victims nor the murder of an individual for his ideas or pronouncements mean the end of democracy or of the constitutional freedoms, or the way in which society and politicians deal with them. An assertive society can and will deal with murder and violence and respond with adequate measures. The dignified, controlled and determined way in which the London population reacted to the recent terrorist attacks commands respect and sets an example worth following. Only if citizens allow their (political) actions to be influenced by fear, or if stop speaking out for the same reason, will the democratic legal order be affected. This is when the violence or threat of further violence generates a paralysing uncertainty that has broader social consequences.

However, radical views may not result only in disruptive actions if the persons promulgating them resort to violence themselves or directly incite others to do so. They may also act as a spark in a powder keg of social tension. The radical views may cause others to feel inspired or justified in committing violent acts. This may be the case because such persons feel justified or obliged to reinforce these views or because others feel justified or obliged to combat this violence because of its dangerous character. Radicalism invites counter-radicalism and violence provokes further violence; the aftermath of the murder of Mr. Van Gogh has made this clear. Different forms of radicalism reinforce each other,

particularly because groups in society become directly opposed. Verbal violence - and that must include insults, verbal discrimination and incitement to hatred - shocks people and fuels mutual misunderstanding and suspicion; the threat of terrorism increases feelings of insecurity.

The disruptive effect of radically inspired actions is further enhanced because not everyone who expresses radical views need necessarily be a radical in the sense that he or she fully supports the radical philosophy. Radical movements are often surrounded by a group of hangers-on who may adopt some of the externalities (the utterances, in word or behaviour), but who are not sufficiently convinced of the ideology to accept further consequences. Another phenomenon is the fact that young people may adopt the verbalisations (and, in part, the philosophy) from a need to acquire an identity or simply to provoke a reaction, or because they seek attention. They often link these verbalisations to forms of behaviour - ultimately escalating to public violence, and therefore always with the inherent risk of fatal consequences - that are traditionally a part of their growing up but that are not permanent. Often it is difficult to distinguish such verbalisations from verbalisations that stem from the true radical ideology.

As a counterweight to the risk of actions that may be interpreted as being radical, there is the risk that the *reaction* to the threat of radicalism itself has a negative effect on the democratic legal order, because the respect for freedoms, rights and dignity are made subordinate to the effectiveness of combating radicalism. This must absolutely not be an option, and the Lower House recently confirmed this in the debate about the memorandum entitled '*Grondrechten in de pluriforme samenleving*' (Fundamental rights in the multiform society).

2.1.2 Subversive ideas

Radicalism does not only constitute a threat to the legal order because of the actions or the threat of actions. Even before any physical actions occur, there is a danger in the fact that radicalism is normally associated with an insensitivity to the relativity of things, an imperviousness to reasonable debate and a deep-rooted conviction of one's own superiority. If this is the predominant attitude, democratic decision-making is rendered more difficult.

The biggest threat to the democratic legal order, however, lies in the fact that radicalism may succeed in obtaining broad support for political objectives that are aimed at ending the democratic legal order. This applies to political

doctrines that are tantamount to the establishment of a dictatorship, but also to religious views that call for a theocracy. Such support need not be a majority. Even the presence of a substantial minority can have major consequences.

It is not only views that advocate a different form of government that may undermine the democratic legal order (for instance a theocracy). Views that are based on denying the freedom, rights and safety of others are no less subversive to the basis and essence of a multiform society like ours. This becomes the case if, for instance, in the Netherlands a certain group wants to introduce administration of the law within its own circle, wants to abandon the starting point of political equality of all citizens, or advocates the abolishment of constitutional or human rights, or demands that a certain philosophical portrayal of mankind - irrespective of whether this is a religious, humanistic or enlightenment ideal - be given priority in Government policy.

Equally subversive, but of a materially different nature, are radical ideas that advocate withdrawal from the legal order. A classic example is the anarchism in the 19th and 20th century. However, some modern radical views amount to the same thing, for instance the view that a person need not comply with legislation and regulations if they conflict with his own opinions, even if the law does not provide for an exception on the grounds of moral conflict. This is an old phenomenon that has recurred through the ages. In the past, society often took a tolerant view of such ideas, as long as it was an incidental phenomenon, on the assumption that the stronger the reaction, the larger the platform they would be granting to the radical philosophy. However, reticence on the part of the Government is not an option if large groups are called upon to abandon their legal obligations if they conflict with the conscience or religion of individuals.

2.2 *Radicalisation*

Radicals are not born, they are made. An understanding of the radicalisation process - how does someone become a radical - may therefore offer clues to prevent and combat this process. This becomes even more important when we consider that the danger of radicalism partly lies in its propagation. The danger of radicalism is not only the violence and the threat of violence as such, but also its effect on society. A radical who advocates overthrowing the democratic constitutional state from the privacy of his study constitutes a manageable risk - but if large numbers of people prove to be susceptible to his message it becomes a different matter.

2.2.1 An individual process

Radicalisation is a complex process in which three aspects play a role: the individual process, the interpersonal dynamics and the effect of circumstances. First and foremost, radicalisation is an individual process. It is concerned with thoughts and preparedness and, ultimately, happens in the head of the person who has increasingly radical thoughts. It is a process in which interpretations change. The person starts to look at the world around him differently and redefines his own relationship with this world. He starts to ask himself moral questions (because of circumstances or because of his stage of life), looks for answers to go with his moral views and, as these answers are increasingly unequivocal/radical, the radicalisation will be strong. Nearly everyone goes through such processes in his lifetime (especially in puberty) without this necessarily resulting in radicalisation. It may be assumed that the question of whether radicalisation will occur depends on the interaction between personality traits and circumstances.

Radicalisation can perhaps best be regarded as adopting a (new) identity or self-image. Looking for one's own identity forms part of every normal development process from child to adult, but it can also be initiated separately from a specific life phase. It may be a result of signals from the environment that someone's identity is no longer being acknowledged or recognised, or that moral question marks are placed next to this identity. It may also be a consequence of the fact that someone no longer experiences society as **his** society - as a result of exclusion, discrimination or because this society functions differently than the person had imagined (frustrated ambitions, experienced or observed humiliations, unrealised objectives or a daily practice that appears to conflict with the ideals of the society in question, etc.). Such experiences may result in alienation, but also in frustration and anger; all this may be a reason the person starts looking (again) for a relationship between himself and his environment that is more acceptable to the person in question. Radicalisation may be an outcome of this search for an identity, but it is certainly not the only possible outcome. One particular aspect of the formation of an identity is the fact that behaviour does not necessarily follow ideas. The reverse is also possible; for instance, young people who feel ignored or unappreciated may start to demonstrate provocative behaviour in order to get attention and then develop a philosophy to suit their behaviour.

2.2.2 The interpersonal dynamics

Doubts about or dissatisfaction with the own identity are essential conditions for radicalisation, but rarely are they sufficient reason on their own. Normally speaking the radicalisation will be impeded by contradiction in social contacts, negative social sanctions and the ability to immunise the extreme views. But

likewise, the role of other people in a person's immediate environment is extremely important in the development of radicalism. A typical example is a situation in which one or more representatives from a radical movement proselytise intensively, or even actively recruit people. This is not unique to radicalism; it also occurs in proselytising and recruitment for virtually every political or religious movement. On this point the difference is not in the method (proselytising, recruitment), but in the content of the views and the techniques that are used. Manipulation of communication (isolation from broader views), social pressure (reward and punishment, social status), the creation of role models (saints, martyrs, etc.) and moral commitment (taking an oath, testament) are techniques that are found in nearly all cases where people must be converted to (radical) ideas and behaviour, even if the actual way in which and extent to which the technique is used may differ. In many cases the presence of others who stimulate and influence the radicalisation process is important. However, there are also cases in which there is no proselytising or recruitment with the use of the aforementioned techniques, but in which someone autonomously develops radical ideas ('self-igniter'). Even then external impulses will generally play a role, but they will not be aimed directly at radicalisation. It is also possible that a number of persons go through such a process together and reinforce the ideas in each other - the autonomous character lies not in the absence of external influences and other people, but in the fact that the process was not intentionally initiated and manipulated by someone else.

Both kinds of processes - proselytising and recruitment, and autonomous development - can also merge into each other. Nearly every organisation that wants to recruit people will indiscriminately distribute information or make it available; radicals are no different. Such information can initiate or support an autonomous process. There are cases where a (radical) movement will deliberately limit itself to initiating autonomous processes: this way the movement stays outside the firing line and creates a support group that has the characteristics of a network held together by intangible ideas rather than of a tangible hierarchical organisation in which the ideas are passed down from high to low.

2.2.3 **Circumstantial effects**

The processes described above, both the individual and the interpersonal process, do not occur in isolation from the environment. Personal as well as social and (geo)political circumstances also have an effect. They may act as the initiator of an individual process, or they can stimulate the interpersonal process or, in contrast, thwart it. And in both processes they can play a legitimising role: society is doing this to me (you) or others who cannot defend themselves, so I (you) can or must resist.

Within this multitude of circumstances the dynamics surrounding minorities deserve special attention. In every society there are mechanisms that draw extra attention to incidents that are caused by members of minority groups, which in turn may stir up feelings within these minority groups of being discriminated against. This 'magnification' of such incidents not only reinforces feelings of discrimination and disrespect, but also may cause a spiralling escalation of action and counteraction. Disproportional and generalising 'hype' in the media and politics may give the public the impression that the problem is greater than it actually is in fact, and this may cause a downward spiral of negative attention and policy reactions. The counter-response of the minority groups, who are feeling cornered, will in turn reinforce the vicious circle of polarisation.

In addition we can point out the availability of different technologies, which means people are less dependent on the coincidental proximity of like-minded people in their physical environment. In this sense the availability of (fast) transport methods is a contributing factor, as is the availability of reliable communication resources. The Internet is extremely useful to people with extreme views, allowing them to broadcast their ideas, trace like-minded people and subsequently contact them with a certain degree of anonymity. The Internet therefore plays an important role in all forms of today's radicalism: nearly all radical groups use websites and chat rooms to prepare and demand joint actions, distribute propaganda and exchange ideas. The Internet also appears to contribute to a new phenomenon: 'cut and paste radicalism', where groups or individuals link the ideas and utterances of others together in an entirely individual manner.

2.3 ***The current situation***

In recent times, Dutch society has been confronted with a number of manifestations of radicalism that instil shock, fear and concern. We will limit ourselves to classifying these manifestations on the basis of the different types of threats.

Violence, the threat of violence and incitement to violence: violence against persons or possessions motivated by radicalism is, without a doubt, today's most alarming phenomenon. Within a relatively short period of time, the Netherlands was recently confronted with two murders that can be linked directly to radicalism. In some cases the violent responses to these murders, such as arson and graffiti on buildings, were equal expressions of radicalism.

But there is more. On a number of occasions in recent years violence, based on apparently racist motives - sometimes with fatal consequences - was committed against individuals. Institutes performing animal tests, breeding farms for furred animals, and agricultural land used for growing genetically modified crops, as well as the property of people working there, have become frequent targets for vandalism. This also applies to religious buildings and cemeteries. In the more distant past there were attacks on branches of companies trading with the then apartheid regime in South Africa, on Ministries, on the homes of politicians and on buildings used for political meetings. More recently we saw demonstrations that resulted in violent confrontations with the police or with dissenters.

Closely linked to actual acts of violence are threats of violence. These may be very direct and targeted threats, for instance in the form of a letter containing a bullet, but also more general threats as expressed in, among others, racist, anti-Semitic, anti-Islamic and anti-globalistic slogans and manifestos.

Also linked to actual acts of violence is incitement to violence, whereby the person inciting the violence does not issue direct threats of violence to a specific person or business, or a category of persons or businesses, but actively encourages others to commit such violence. These days such incitement to violence is found mostly on the Internet, but some phenomena associated with (youth) culture - for instance in the rap music genre - may also be construed as such.

Indirect incitement to and eliciting of violence: Different in nature than the aforementioned phenomena are concrete expressions of and incitement to hatred or discrimination against a specific group. Experience shows us that, even though there is no direct incitement to violence against the target of the hatred or discrimination, susceptible spirits can easily regard this as an excuse for violence, even more so when the utterance or incitement comes in a context in which, in the eyes of some, it may be considered a moral or religious duty to act upon it.

Related to this latter category, but also to the category of violence, are utterances in which violence in general or against specific persons or categories of persons (under certain circumstances) is presented as being

acceptable/desirable, in which others are presented as being inferior or in which the superiority of the own group is espoused.

Threat to an open society: A separate category is formed by utterances of intolerance toward opinion-forming, political, religious or cultural utterances or convictions of others. In this context we should particularly consider utterances that do not so much threaten violence or incite to violence or hatred, but that, in the concrete social context, contribute to an atmosphere in which the affected persons feel that the core of their being is being violated, or in which they have reason to fear that the intolerance expressed in such a manner may cause others to resort to violence. These kinds of utterances occur in many forms: anti-Semitism, homophobia and Islamophobia are some of them.

Rejection of the values of society: A further category, finally, is the utterance and dissemination of philosophies and opinions that constitute a rejection of (key) values and standards of Dutch society, or the support of values and forms that are not compatible with those of Dutch society (for instance advocating and politically supporting the introduction of the Shari'a in the Netherlands). Here too, the rule applies that the phenomena appear in virtually every form (fundamentalism, anarchism, political activism and extremism); in addition to opinion-forming and utterances the most notable characteristic is the wearing of clothes and/or other external attributes that are associated with radical views.

Based on an analysis of these phenomena we can draw the conclusion that, at present, there are three forms of radicalism that constitute a material threat to Dutch society: radicalism that finds its origin in a specific interpretation of the Islam, right-wing radicalism and animal rights activism. The appendix will look more closely at these three phenomena.

3 **Radicalism and radicalisation: what can we do?**

The previous chapter analyses radicalism as a social phenomenon, both in terms of definition and in terms of development. Based on the responsibility of due care and attention which both the Government and society as a whole should have toward all population groups in the country, this alone is cause for a policy that - in a general sense - is aimed at eliminating the breeding grounds for radicalisation. More specifically, the previous chapter indicates that there are currently three forms of radicalism in society that require a response because they affect the democratic legal order.

In this chapter we will look at the options for preventing and combating radicalism and radicalisation. First, a number of general insights will be 'distilled' from the analysis; next, a practical framework will be presented: *who* can do *what*, and what obstructions do we need to beware of.

3.1 ***Insights for combating radicalism and radicalisation***

An initial important insight from the aforementioned analysis is the fact that the threat presented by radicalism does not, in the first place, lie in the content of the philosophy, but rather in the social functioning of the (anticipated) implementation thereof. This means that the Government's efforts at combating radicalism must always be based on this social functioning. This may mean that certain forms of radicalism must be combated because (the dissemination of) the philosophy as such - even if it does not directly or indirectly result in violence - constitutes a threat to the democratic order. It may also mean that action is needed against types of utterances that, directly or indirectly, (may) result in violence or that must be classed as being hurtful, discriminating or otherwise unacceptable. It certainly means that the Government needs to be reticent when it concerns ideas that many in society may consider objectionable, but that otherwise have little effect. However, this does not change the fact that individual citizens or private organisations can then turn against the philosophy in question.

The analysis of the radicalisation process provides insights that are relevant to the efforts at combating it. The first insight is the fact that the interpersonal dynamics can be disrupted by limiting or removing the external influences. The transformation of an identity can be influenced by the elements offered by education or through other facilities. However, the fact that this is an individual process that occurs in the head and heart of the person in question means that these possibilities are limited. It also means that combating the process of radicalisation from this angle may, potentially, involve the limitation or infringement of the person's privacy and freedom. The individual process also implies that (violent) radicalism cannot be entirely prevented or

combated by removing or changing the social circumstances that partially influence it.

The second insight is the fact that it is not possible to combat radicalism and radicalisation by accommodating the grievances used as legitimisation. Radicalisation may have its source in certain wrongs, but ultimately it is the product of personal choices, views and temperament and of interpersonal dynamics. Once these factors have done their job, accommodating the grievances will have little further effect. Of course this does not change the fact that, if these grievances are found to be justified, the situation should be remedied. In the long term this may also contribute to reducing radicalism: even if it does not convert any existing radicals, it may limit the breeding grounds for the growth of radicalism.

Finally, understanding the process of radicalisation also teaches us that a frontal attack on radical views and actions will only have limited results. Some people may allow their identity to be taken away under pressure, but for most such an approach is more likely to reinforce their radical views. It may make them more willing to become martyrs. The combating of radicalism must therefore focus on specific malicious utterances and elements, but must otherwise leave people with radical views enough room to experience and express their convictions in other, more peaceful ways. The more convincingly Government actions make it clear that violence, threats and transgressions against the social structure are not the way to realise radical views and that other, peaceful methods do offer some perspective, the greater the chances are that these latter methods will ultimately be chosen.

Another thing all this teaches us is that combating radicalism is going to take perseverance. Radicalism, once it has taken root in a society, is very difficult to remove - especially because it affects people's faith in each other and in society as a whole.

3.2 *Practical framework*

The above general insights still only provide an incomplete answer to the question of how radicalism can best be dealt with. It is not possible to answer this question in any detail. Radicalism and radicalisation are not unequivocal phenomena. There are different types, each with a very different background, development and manifestation. Even the three forms that currently require special attention because of their willingness to use violence differ greatly (see the appendix). However, it is still possible to formulate a number of general starting points for dealing with radicalism. These starting points are listed below.

3.2.1 Starting points

In view of the necessity to combat the aforementioned forms of radicalism, a number of principles must be strictly observed. These are principles relating to the adverse effects of combating certain ideas, the need to isolate radicalism from its environment and the possible conflict between combating radicalism and the principles of the democratic legal order. These are the principles of legality, proportionality, legitimacy, specificity and flexibility.

Legality: In a democratic legal order, any Government actions must be based on statutory powers and must be democratically controlled. The general legal framework was recently discussed with the Lower House in the debate about the aforementioned '*Grondrechten in een pluriforme samenleving*' [Fundamental rights in a multiform society] memorandum. The starting points are multiformity and freedom; restrictions to these starting points are sometimes necessary and even possible, but they are exceptions that require a specific legal basis. Government actions that do not so much constitute a restriction but rather consist of offering alternatives - and therefore in fact increase freedom - are subject to less strict rules.

Proportionality: In view of the fact that radicalism in general is inherent in the multiformity that the democratic constitutional state aims to protect, it is important for the Government not to overreact in its approach to radicalism, as this might present a risk of 'throwing out the baby with the bathwater'. Because combating radicalism may inadvertently result in harm to the democratic constitutional state, caution is required. A careless approach may be counterproductive because this reinforces the [negative] view of society already held by the persons in question, and may encourage others to be sympathetic.

Legitimacy: the Government's efforts at combating radicalism and radicalisation must be legitimate *and* be experienced as such. Of course this is a requirement that generally applies to all Government policy. However, in the case of combating radicalism and radicalisation there are additional reasons for the need for legitimacy. Uncertainty and fear in respect of the threat of radicalism are currently a significant social issue. Removing this fear is an important political motive. However, the desire to see results cannot be a justification for unlawful actions; effectiveness cannot be the determining criterion for what is allowed - this would put (constitutional) rights at risk.

Another reason, that is no less important, is the fact that the aforementioned forms of radicalism are currently being combated exactly because they use unlawful means and unacceptable threats and justify this behaviour on the basis of the intended result. In the rhetoric of radicalism, this element of

justice therefore plays a major role. Government actions that are not lawful, or that are experienced as being unlawful in the radical environment, will therefore frustrate the pursuit of isolation. Such actions will reinforce the ideas of the persons in question, mobilise their environment into giving them support and may possibly make society more susceptible to the radical arguments.

General and specific: the principle of legitimacy means that actions on the part of the Government must, at the same time, be general and extremely specific. They must be general to avoid the impression of unequal treatment and because radicalism comes in many shapes. It cannot always be equated with just one form. However much the threat of Islamic radicalism may currently be experienced as being dominant, the combating of radicalism can and must not focus only on this form. In view of the fact that other threats are also very real, dealing with only one form of radicalism will increase the support for this form, confirm perceived injustice and turn criminals into martyrs.

At the same time the approach will have to be very specific. A situation whereby the combating of radicalism focuses or appears to focus on characteristics that are shared by a broader group must be avoided. For instance, a situation whereby the combating of violent animal rights activism is experienced as being aimed at every animal rights supporter must be prevented. Likewise, a situation in which radicalism is associated with certain social, religious, ethnic or cultural characteristics must be avoided at any cost. After all, if the combating of radicalism is not sufficiently specific it will create its own resistance and therefore inadvertently fuel the radicalism. For the same reason the radical groups will always try to confirm the view that the combating of radicalism is not being aimed at malicious utterances, but at general characteristics.

Specificity is also necessary because the various forms of radicalism do not differ only in respect of their objective and message, but also in respect of their structure and methods, and the manner in which they are integrated into the culture of their immediate environment in society. The fact that some utterances may give the impression that they have a radical background but are, in reality, often primarily linked to a certain age phase must also be taken into account. Although each of these characteristics provides a point of application in the combating of radicalism, at the same time the approach will have to be different depending on the point of application in question.

Flexibility: flexibility is necessary because those against whom the Government aims to act will always try to push the boundaries of the law and

It will therefore be necessary to creatively deploy or (further) develop tools to target the concrete situation. The structure of (virtual) networks and the special aspect of autonomous radicalisation and the 'cut and paste radicalism' of the self-igniters reinforce this necessity.

3.2.2 Focal Points

In principle there are three focal points where measures for combating malicious radicalism and radicalisation can be applied.

The first focal point concerns those with radical ideas themselves - the persons who want to take action on the basis of their radical philosophy or who want to recruit others for this philosophy or have them act in the spirit of this philosophy.

A separate category that still forms part of the first focal point is those who use the symbols, slogans and arguments of the radicals without sharing the philosophy - for instance because they want to provoke -, and those who commit certain acts from motives that are not radical but that, because of the context, are considered expressions of radicalism.

A third category we can distinguish within this focal point is those who wilfully, or at least knowingly, support or facilitate the activities of the radicals - possibly without sharing their views.

The second focal point concerns the expressions (or images) of the radical philosophy: documents, image and/or sound recordings etc., which disseminate the ideas. Incidentally, these may be texts or images that were prepared with this specific objective in mind, or texts or images that those with a radical philosophy are simply 'hijacking' for their own purposes. This focal point also includes the media that can be used for the distribution of these texts or images: books, magazines, video or audio tapes, and the Internet. Here too it is possible, under certain circumstances, for non-radical material to be hijacked for radical purposes.

The third focal point is the very large category of those whose feelings or attitudes are touched or affected by radicalism. In regard to this focal point we must recognise a number of sub-categories. In the first place there is the category of people who are (potentially) touched by radicalism:

- the sympathisers, those who share the ideas of the hard core of radicals, but do not act on these ideas or distribute them;
- those who are susceptible; people who are, in principle, open to the radical views and may even allow themselves to be recruited;
- those who do not share the radical views, but do have certain ideas in common. These are people who, in reaction to the way the Government and society respond to radicalism, feel they are being regarded as 'the

enemy' and who will start acting accordingly by supporting the radicals in any way they can.

In the second place there is the category of people who are affected by radicalism:

- those who are targeted by the radicals with the objective of instilling fear, either to force them to behave in a certain manner or to prevent them from behaving in a certain manner;
- those at whom, as a person or as a member of a category, the violence, hatred etc. is aimed directly.

Those who are affected by radicalism could be classed as potential victims of the manifestations of radicalism and the first two types of those who are touched by radicalism could be classed as a breeding ground for radicalism - they have the potential to be recruited and there is a risk of self-radicalisation. The last sub-category of those touched by radicalism (people who share some of the views) is ambiguous: someone who is associated with radicalism and who experiences negative consequences of this radicalism may be considered an indirect victim ('collateral damage'). At the same time, this may also be a reason for or contribute to an individual or group-based radicalisation process.

Each of the aforementioned focal points offers opportunities for various specific approaches. Those with a radical attitude of mind and their immediate background of supporters can - in principle - be prevented from disseminating their ideas or turning them into actions. It is possible to prevent, disrupt or obstruct the use of communication channels. Furthermore, those who are or may be touched by radicalism can be protected or rendered less vulnerable.

4 Main outlines of the policy

As stated previously, a combination of the insights presented in the previous paragraphs conclude that there are three main policy directions for the Government where combating radicalism and radicalisation is concerned. Two fairly general directions - because they are aimed both at society as a whole and at specific groups - are the reinforcement of the bond between, on the one hand, individuals and communities, and on the other hand, society in general, as well as the democratic legal order; and *empowerment*, in other words: increasing assertiveness. The third main policy direction, which is aimed specifically at the radicals, the radicalisers and their supporters and/or their actions, utterances and communication channels, is active intervention.

For each of these three main policy directions, the rule applies that they cannot be pursued by the (Central) Government alone. Collaboration with others in society is essential. The other requirement, of course, is for the problem of radicalism to be explored and recognised.

4.1 *Cohesion*

Assertiveness requires courage, *Zivilkourage*. For individuals who know they are associated with radicals or who have certain characteristics or opinions in common with them, there is a certain risk attached to distancing themselves from actual radicals. It is therefore fair to expect that they will only be prepared to do so if they feel connected to the values of the democratic legal order and if they feel that, with their non-radical views, they are protected within this legal order.

Reinforcing the bond that individuals in such groups have with Dutch society is therefore the second main policy direction. An important aspect of this direction is to ensure that those people who could be susceptible to the argument that society leaves them too little room, do feel that they are part of this society and that they, too, (can) experience its benefits. Another aspect is that individuals and groups who are being intimidated must know that they are protected by the legal order; but this also implies that they must then refuse to be provoked.

Reinforcing the bond that vulnerable groups have with society is a spearhead of the Cabinet's policy, even separate from the topic of combating radicalisation. To promote participation, much effort has been made to develop policies that are (partially) aimed at increasing social cohesion. Needless to say, such policies can contribute to the prevention of radicalisation, in the same way that they can contribute to the integration of minorities or the reinforcement of values and norms. It is particularly

important that, in the implementation of such policies, a lot of attention is given to the early detection and prevention of (young) people dropping out of school and 'going off the rails'. These events may not always inevitably result in radicalisation, but they can be a harbinger of a potential development in this direction. Concrete measures that are currently being implemented or that the Cabinet is planning, are:

- the creation of pre-conditions to promote social cohesion through the Social Support Act;
- reinforcing the approach to the prevention of young people dropping out of school through Operation 'Young';
- numerous measures in the area of education, including the aforementioned promotion of active citizenship (in accordance with the memorandum entitled '*Onderwijs, integratie en burgerschap*' (Education, integration and citizenship) of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, but also increased security in schools, the establishment of a radicalism reporting point at the Inspectorate, offering a training course for the mentoring and coaching of teachers and pupils as well as the support of pupils who are at risk;
- promoting integration and cohesion through sport, which will be an item in the Sport memorandum to be published later this year.

Later this year a memorandum on the contribution that art and culture can make to the enhancement of social cohesion and integration will be submitted to the Lower House.

The reinforcement of the bond with society requires a certain consensus about the way in which the population groups in this society deal with each other's sensitivities. This does not mean that it is necessary for everyone to have the same opinion as to what is or what is not acceptable. What is important is that there is clarity about the boundaries so that the awareness that all people are treated equally can grow. Part of this process is for (potential) victims of hurtful utterances or behaviour to counteract such utterances or behaviour themselves by uniting and taking joint action. This action may be taken through the civil court if the hurtful utterance or behaviour constitutes an unlawful act. However, we are not just talking about legal boundaries and norms. The debate on this subject can be encouraged by making it possible to discuss insults and the unnecessary hurting of the feelings of certain population groups in ways other than through the courts. An example of such an alternative approach is the Equal Treatment Commission.

In addition to discrimination, hurtful utterances or the continuous highlighting of ethnic or social differences, measures for combating radicalism that are not limited to the core of radicalism and its malicious manifestations may also have an adverse effect on peoples' sense of protection and social cohesion. Actions against verbal violence in public debate – making hurtful

and shocking statements, for instance - require a particularly balanced approach. If the hurting of some feelings results in a public outcry while comparable injuries to other feelings are dismissed with an appeal to the freedom of speech, this will not help people feel that they are all protected equally.

4.2 *Empowerment*

It is not the Government's efforts that ultimately determine the combating of radicalism, but the assertiveness of society and the involvement of its citizens. Radicalism must primarily be combated in daily life: by means of public debate and by taking away its support. A radical philosophy is not quite so threatening if there is sufficient opposition against it. Furthermore, Government action against radicalism will usually have few consequences or may even result in adverse effects if radical views are received sympathetically by more than a limited group of direct supporters or perceived as being innocent by large sections of the population.

A condition for combating radicalisation is isolating radical groups from their breeding grounds and increasing the assertiveness of the individuals in their immediate environment. This refers both to resistance against possible intimidation by radicals and appeals for loyalty, and the ability of people to withstand the temptation or provocations of radical theories.

Especially in the case of radicalism among ethnic groups, assertiveness within the own community is essential to turn the tide of radicalisation within that community. To do so we need debate - within the ethnic circle in question - about the factors that lead to radicalisation and possible disruptive actions. Debate within the own circle increases the support people get from each other when rejecting radicalism. It also helps in clarifying differing standpoints and sensitivities within that circle to everyone who is part of it.

There is also a need for a broader public debate, and for participation in this debate by communities that are confronted with radicalism in their midst. Provided such a broader debate is honest and open-minded, it can contribute to mutual understanding and respect in peaceful coexistence; this is the exact spirit in which the city debates in Rotterdam were held. Participation of the communities in question can also contribute to increased public assertiveness against undeserved incriminations and misconceptions. After all, there is always a risk that society will associate individuals who share some characteristics or views with radicals with those radicals. This is something that must be prevented; after all, this would put moderate forces on a par with radical groups, both in the eyes of the radicals within their own circle and the outside world. The way to prevent such a situation is, in the first place, to

generate clarity about the way in which the non-radical version can be distinguished from the radical version. Understanding the difference between moderate and radical variants of a philosophy makes it easier for moderate supporters to recognise and reject the radical variant, and it gives outsiders criteria to formulate a more balanced opinion. Following on from this, however, it is essential that it is clearly visible that the radical views are also being rejected within their own circle. This makes it clear to outsiders who are concerned about a particular form of radicalism that it is not the philosophy as such that is causing them concern, but only the radical variant of this philosophy. Supporters of less radical forms not only benefit from this because they are prevented from being associated with radicalism, but also because many forms of radicalism will first of all attempt to undermine the most closely-related freedom of thought in regard to that philosophy.

Although increasing the assertiveness of a society is first and foremost the responsibility of that society itself, it still requires support from the Government - support in the form of attention for the subject in education, in the form of amenities for public organisations, in the form of facilities, in the form of statutory rights and liabilities and, if necessary, in the form of targeted intervention. For instance, the Government, the media and cultural institutions each have a responsibility in the broad distribution of information about the differences in viewpoints between moderate and radical forms of a specific philosophy. In a multiform society it is not feasible for the Government to distribute such information itself, but it can encourage individuals and, more specifically, organisations to do so and give them the opportunity to do so. Intervening if the public debate derails is also a Government task in this context.

Concrete activities on the part of the Government aimed at increasing assertiveness have recently been announced and implemented. The programmes of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Minister of Government Reform and Kingdom Relations, the Minister of Education, Culture and Science, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment and the State Secretary for Health, Welfare and Sport aimed at enhancing citizenship and the ability to participate in the multiform democratic legal order, which were announced in the Cabinet response to the report entitled '*De last van het gedrag*' published by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Reform, form a general basis for the development of assertiveness. The memorandum entitled '*Weerbaarheid tegen radicalisatie van moslemjongeren*' (Resistance against the radicalisation of young Moslems) (Parliamentary documents II, 2004/05, 29 800 VI, no. 117), which the Minister of Immigration and Integration recently submitted to the Lower House accompanied by an action plan, announces a large number of measures both in relation to assertiveness and the distribution of knowledge. A more detailed version of this will be published together with this memorandum.

Even Government policy that is not primarily aimed at increasing the assertiveness of society as a whole or of specific groups can still contribute to this objective. The anti-discrimination policy is a good example of this.

Discrimination in the employment market can contribute to the kinds of frustrations that make young people susceptible to radical ideas. The State Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment recently commissioned a study into the obstructions that people from ethnic minorities experience in the employment market. The study confirmed that discrimination does in fact exist. The Cabinet response, which was submitted to the Lower House on 12 May, gives an overview of a large number of measures for combating discrimination. In part these are measures that have already been implemented, such as the campaign entitled '*Discriminatie? Niet met mij!*' (Discrimination? Not with me!) and the recent establishment of a National Diversity Management Network, which will encourage employers to conduct an (HRM) policy aimed at attracting and retaining people from various population groups. A considerable proportion of the measures are new measures that are mostly implemented by public organisations, where necessary with support from the Central Government: an employment plan for refugees, various initiatives aimed at coaching young people from ethnic minorities, a training course on 'how to respond to discrimination' and a reinforcement of the enforcing role of the Equal Treatment Commission.

The promotion of the emancipation of homosexuals and more specifically the improvement of the relationship between ethnic minorities and ethnic and native homosexuals must also be mentioned in this context.

4.3 *Active intervention*

Increasing assertiveness and reinforcing the bond with society are relatively general approaches that will be especially effective in respect of the radicalisation process and the consequences of radicalism. However, in view of the threat posed by radicalism, more is required. If these two approaches are not sufficient, the Government must actively intervene. The three focal points referred to earlier offer opportunities for doing so, whereby it must be considered that, depending on the nature of the intervention, these focal points are subject to strict, statutorily prescribed conditions, both with regard to the person or matter receiving the attention (material requirements) and the method of the intervention (formal requirements).

4.3.1 Radicals and their environment

Logically speaking, there are three possibilities for dealing with those who have a radical attitude of mind or who act in a way that indicates a radical attitude of mind, and those in their direct environment who actively support them.

The first possibility is to change their views. In view of the fact that radicals tend to be closed to reasonable debate, this approach is rarely effective. However, that is not a reason to refrain from trying, especially since it could possibly be effective in the transition period between radical thinking and radical action, certainly if the latter includes a sacrifice. It may be assumed that an attempt to change someone's views can also be effective in respect of supporters, certainly if they do not provide their support on the basis of commitment to the cause but for financial gain or as a result of (group) pressure. Realising efforts in this area by means of broad campaigns would not seem to be a good method. A targeted approach, embedded in the policy that is aimed at increasing assertiveness and reinforcing the bond with society, and also embedded in exploration and observation, is a more obvious solution.

The second possibility is to deter them. Once again, we cannot expect much from this in all cases. The usual method, threatening with sanctions, can in fact be attractive to radicals because it gives the person being sanctioned the status of a martyr. But here, too, the rule applies that for part of the target group - the hangers-on, those who act without sharing the philosophy - this approach can certainly be effective.

The third possibility is to make it impossible for radicals to act. Apart from the possibility that the radical in question will be replaced - a new torchbearer - and the temporary nature of the solution, this is by definition an effective method. The way to implement it is to impose a sanction or a coercive measure. This may be a criminal sanction (prison sentence, other restriction of liberty), but also an administrative sanction (revocation of permit, obligation, prohibition, deportation) or a civil sanction (obligation, prohibition).

It must be remembered that the second and third possibilities, although aimed at individuals, must be based on their actions and can only rarely be applied in response to intentions. Criminal law provides the main framework for combating violence, threatening behaviour, verbal violence and other utterances that directly or indirectly threaten violence against individuals or population groups.

Administrative law gives authorities at all levels the opportunity to obstruct the activities of radical groups when they develop activities in the social sphere. A focal point for implementing measures that will prevent individuals or organisations from disseminating radical views or radicalising others may be to require them to have a permit for a certain activity - or possibly even for their stay in the Netherlands or (in the case of organisations) for their actual

existence; in this way their activities can be monitored and can or may otherwise be subject to regulation. In a number of cases the sources of radicalisation can be dealt with in this manner; for instance in the case of Islamic radicalism these methods can be applied to spiritual leaders who recruit young people. This is possible if the person in question comes under the Aliens Act.

By means of the Bibob (*Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act*), information about possible radical involvement can be deployed for the purpose of monitoring activities or granting permits. This normally does assume that, in respect of individuals involved in the activities or in the organisation, criminal activities have been observed that justify the suppression of certain activities. This is of course desirable. A situation whereby individual administrative bodies each start to develop their own policies must be prevented. In a relatively short period of time this could result in a witch hunt that would discredit the necessary counteractions against radicalism and would only reinforce the breeding grounds for malicious radicalism.

When it comes to administrative powers, we must specifically point out the options that municipalities have for acting against individuals or organisations that are directly financially dependent on the municipality, especially in the form of subsidies or social benefits, or that otherwise (want to) use municipal facilities (education, housing etc.). A number of municipalities are currently developing policies in this area; see, for instance, the Rotterdam action programme entitled '*Meedoen of achterblijven*' (Join in or get left behind).

4.3.2 Actions and words

Logically speaking there are two options for counteracting the acts used to put the radical philosophy into practice (or actions that support/enable such acts), or the words used to disseminate the radical philosophy.

The first action is to make it impossible to perform these acts or to express/disseminate these words. This is, by definition, also an effective method, but one that is very difficult to apply. Normally this will only be successful through the removal of the sources or instruments, or by making communication channels unavailable. This is, above all, possible if these resources, instruments or communication channels are only available in the legal circuit and are used against the will of those in charge of their use or availability.

The second option for counteracting acts and (the dissemination of) words is disrupting (especially in the preparatory phase) or impeding their

implementation. Considerable experience has been gained with this approach, which fits in with the broader methods of counteraction, in the combating of (organised) crime. This method would *appear* to be less effective than making the performance of these acts or the expression/dissemination of these words impossible, but this need not be the case: provided the method is applied intensively, it *can* have the same effect. It will normally also be easier to realise: the instruments needed to do so form part of the monitoring and controlling powers of Government authorities, and the Government is not dependent on the cooperation of others to use them.

In the context of combating terrorism, a disruptive approach has now been developed with a view to certain identified sources of radicalism. The purport of this approach is to curb radicalisation activities as they are being developed in a specific place or a specific institution. The objective is to force those who are responsible for the management of the place or institution in question to change course.

Radicalising individuals and groups frequently use the Internet, not only to broadcast radical, hatred-inducing messages but especially also for the exchange of knowledge and information. There are different options for monitoring and dealing with the Internet usage of these groups. By means of the progress report on combating terrorism the Lower House has now been further informed; the letter dated 11 August on the subject of a system of reporting points and Notice & Take Down (Parliamentary documents II, 2004/05, 28197 no. 22) indicates that the first priority for this system will be the combating of hatred-inducing and terrorist utterances. In the further definition of the system, a careful consideration of the benefits, international collaboration, and linking-in to the other developments in the area of combating ICT criminality and terrorism will serve as the starting points.

Foreign radio and TV programmes that can be received in the Netherlands are also used as a medium for inducing hatred and radicalising individuals and groups. The aforementioned progress report on combating terrorism deals with this, and with the way in which these measures can be effectively deployed and improved. The report also deals with the motion submitted by Van As et al. It is clear that it is not possible to stop every undesirable broadcast. In principle, only signals from countries the Netherlands collaborates with in the combating of terrorism can be stopped. Preventing extremist broadcasting stations from broadcasting in the Netherlands does therefore, by definition, have an international dimension.

4.3.3 The individuals who are affected

In respect of those who are affected by the acts or words of radicalism, the Government has two options. Protecting possible targets (especially targets of violence) directly, through security measures, is the first and most far-reaching method, whereby the Government takes responsibility for a number of security measures in respect of a threatened person, and possibly also participates in the actual protection. This does not transfer the actual safety of the person involved to the Government; rather, it is the outcome of, among other things, these measures and the actions of the person involved. The framework for this was laid down in the protection and security system as described in the letter to the Lower House dated 20 June 2003 (Parliamentary documents II, 28 974, numbers 1 and 2). The letter dated 25 March 2005 (Parliamentary documents II, 30 011, no. 2) about the protection of Members of Parliament goes into more detail on this subject.

The second option is to (indirectly) provide supportive protective measures to potential targets. This does not go as far as directly protecting them. For instance, these supportive measures could consist of prohibitive stipulations or offering (legal) instruments that those affected can use to protect themselves. Civil law provides victims of threatening behaviour, insults or hurtful actions (for instance discrimination) with options to take direct action against the perpetrator. The question whether the thresholds for doing so should be lowered in the case of public utterances, by establishing a facility along the lines of the Equal Treatment Commission, is still being discussed.

4.4 *Exploration and recognition*

The effective combating of radicalism requires early recognition and observation of potential sources of radicalisation. Radicalism can only be combated if it is visible. To this effect we need continuous exploration of phenomena in society that reveal radicalism that could be a potential threat. Different forms of radicalism that occur will have to be evaluated and mapped out, also with a view to disrupting and isolating the process of radicalisation and to obtain a better understanding of those involved in this process and those threatened by it. As stated in the introduction, local authorities have an important responsibility in this; the mapping out of the local situation requires a customised approach that is embedded in the contacts between a municipality, its citizens and a number of organisations. The following paragraphs look at this in more detail.

4.5 *Local approach, central support, international collaboration*

4.5.1 *General principles*

Decentralised authorities must take the lead in a successful approach to radicalism (and particularly Moslem radicalism and potential right-wing extremism), as they are best able to generate an accurate picture through discussions with, among others, the local (ethnic) community and on the basis of information from, for instance, the police, municipal services and contacts with the local community. Municipalities can be expected to take charge, on a local basis, of measures like the establishment of a system for the early recognition of manifestations of radicalism, and the administrative combating of radicalism and extremism, as Amsterdam and Rotterdam are already doing in conjunction with, among others, the NCTb (*National Coordinating Agency for Combating Terrorism*). The preventative aspects of the approach and the connection to the local integration policy also deserve attention. The police take a strong position in consulting with municipal councils and now work closely with a number of municipal services and institutions. In conjunction with, among others, the NCTb and the AIVD, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations supports the municipalities and police forces in their role in combating radicalism.

4.5.2 Local approaches

In its report entitled '*Van Dawa tot Jihad*' (From Dawa to Jihad), among other publications, the AIVD describes a link between the different 'steps' that may lead to radicalism and, ultimately, also to terrorism. Incidentally, this is not a causal process, whereby one 'step' necessarily follows on from the previous one.

The starting point for combating terrorism is a broad approach that focuses on all four steps. These steps are: non integration, radicalisation, recruitment and potential terrorism. The AIVD feels that, in respect of the first two steps, a leading role is reserved for the local authorities. Locally, the correct approach can be achieved in the 'triangle' between the municipality, the police and the Public Prosecution Service. The municipality is in charge of this process. The main role for the local authorities is to establish an information position in close collaboration with the local (Moslem) community. The Central Government can facilitate and stimulate this process, but not centrally direct it, as it is a situation in which there is a considerable need for measures which are 'tailor-made' in regard to the situation of a specific municipality or city. Only by collecting information through the many contacts the local authorities have with the community can signals be properly interpreted.

In a number of - mostly larger – municipalities, the municipal councils have now taken steps to recognise and combat radicalism and radicalisation.

The municipality of Rotterdam, for instance, has developed an action programme for the prevention of radicalisation and extremism under the name '*Meedoen or Achterblijven*' (Join in or get left behind), which focuses on social cohesion and isolation. With this approach the Municipal Executive wants to make it clear that every inhabitant of Rotterdam, regardless of nationality or religion, who wants to actively participate in Rotterdam society will be given the chance to do so and, where necessary, will receive assistance. At the same time, it means that people who choose not to participate and so exclude themselves, are dealt with harshly. The action programme contains 44 action points that constitute a further definition of the main objectives. These include the active combating of discrimination in the employment market, the start-up of a language offensive and the support of further initiatives in the area of integration and emancipation.

The Action Programme indicates which groups and individuals are susceptible to radicalisation. The municipality proposes a number of preventative and, where necessary, repressive measures that must result in increased resistance against radicalisation. The existing information exchange between municipal services/sub-municipalities and the police/Ministry of Justice is being enhanced. A further concrete action point is training and educating municipal functionaries to recognise radicalisation on the basis of pre-developed risk profiles. The Rotterdam Municipal Executive wants to use functionaries who already fulfil an observational function, such as the city marines, members of intervention teams, compulsory education functionaries and safety coordinators.

In response to the murder of Mr. Van Gogh, the municipality of Amsterdam has also formulated an action plan entitled '*Wij Amsterdammers*' (We, the citizens of Amsterdam). The objectives of this plan, in addition to combating terrorism, are combating radicalisation and promoting social cohesion. The concrete actions include improving the information position of the municipality by making better use of the observational capabilities of municipal functionaries and the databases the municipality already has available. In addition, the municipality is focusing on combating discrimination and the distribution of extremist propaganda, and on facilitating education and employment.

4.5.3 Central support

In addition to existing and future local initiatives, the Central Government has three main responsibilities. The first responsibility is protecting the legal order, the public order and the democracy by deploying resources that are unique to the Central Government (for instance criminal law) and/or that come under its authority (for instance national investigation and intelligence services) to combat and disrupt (manifestations of) radicalism, and to support the work

done by local authorities in this area. The second responsibility is to create - where this falls within the Government's powers - conditions for a society in which people are not attracted to radicalism. The third responsibility is stimulating, facilitating and, where necessary, coordinating those aspects that can only be implemented at a local level.

It is important to realise that each of these responsibilities requires a different role. The deployment of resources and authorities to combat and disrupt radicalism and radicalisation requires a certain level of precise direction and coordination, without encroaching on the responsibilities and powers of both local authorities and those in charge of the national investigation and intelligence services any more than is absolutely necessary. In cases where this will generally happen with a view to preventing terrorism or other direct attacks on the legal order it is obvious that the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice in particular have a role to play. A coordinating and somewhat directional role on the part of these Ministers is also desirable when it concerns the development of the criteria for recognising radicalism and for the deployment of the administrative instrumentarium by local authorities. A situation in which many wheels are invented, which then subsequently start turning in different directions, must be prevented. For the condition-creating and stimulating/facilitating tasks, finally, it is not so much tight direction and coordination that are required, but rather collaboration and mutual encouragement. It must be remembered that, although some of these tasks are covered by the integration policy (see the relevant memorandum from the Minister of Immigration and Integration), a contribution from other policy areas is also required, without it being appropriate to specifically earmark these as policies that are implemented in the context of radicalisation. This is where coordination between the policies of the various responsible Ministers is essential.

In more general terms the cohesion and sense of solidarity in society require reinforcement and support. To this effect the Cabinet policy supports and stimulates numerous initiatives by citizens and public organisations. The letter from the Minister of Immigration and Integration to the Lower House (Parliamentary documents II, 2004/05, 30 054, no. 1) on the subject of the 'Broad Social Cohesion Initiative' lists a large number of action points and agreements intended to make a contribution to reinforcing social cohesion in society.

4.5.4 International collaboration

As discussed before, the forms of radicalism against which action is required are characterised by an international component. The need for international collaboration to prevent and combat terrorism is acknowledged in the Hague

Programme, among others. After all, the causes and effects of radicalism and radicalisation do not stop at the border. In addition to the other measures for preventing and combating terrorism this programme also indicates that the Council will develop a long-term strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment. The EU action plan for combating terrorism that was updated in 2004 also offers points of application for European collaboration on this point, among others in the area of information exchange between European police forces and intelligence services, but also through a more targeted EU study into recruitment and radicalisation tendencies in relation to media, Internet and education and prisons, and how they can be dealt with effectively. In addition, the EU will also work together with third-party countries to combat radicalisation and recruitment.

Two aspects are important in this context. In the first place it is possible to learn lessons from other countries, in particular those countries that have previously been confronted with forms of radicalism that constitute a real threat. Examples of such countries are the United Kingdom, Germany and France; these examples provide useful insights, but also show us that policies and measures being developed and deployed in these countries cannot always be directly or integrally applied to the Dutch situation. Differences between (administrative) cultures but also between the legal systems of different countries mean that we need to carefully check the usefulness and suitability for our situation of the policies and legislation developed in other countries.

The second aspect is of course that of collaboration. Existing multilateral collaborations, such as the EU, the Council of Europe and collaborations in a UN context, as well as the more informal inter-governmental collaborations, offer promising opportunities in this respect.

5 Conclusion

The Government and society must prevent, in a general sense, that a lack of care and concern for the social circumstances of certain groups creates a breeding ground for radicalism. Separately from this the Government must act against radicalism that constitutes a material threat to the public order, the legal order and the democratic constitutional state.

Right-wing radicalism, radicalism based on abuse of the Islam and animal rights activism all currently manifest themselves in the Netherlands in ways that constitute such a threat that Government intervention is necessary and justified, although not all threats have the same severity. Occasionally the threats are accompanied by violence that results in direct victims; such threats with actual violence have a disruptive effect on society. Furthermore, right-wing radicalism and radicalism based on abuse of Islam also espouse social and legal views that, if they were to gain broad support, would seriously harm the democratic relations between citizens and the Government as well as the legal relations between citizens themselves.

After an analysis of radicalism in general and the aforementioned forms of radicalism in particular, as well as radicalisation trends, the previous chapters outlined a strategy for dealing with these phenomena. They indicated that there are three main approaches:

- aimed at radicals and their supporters in the immediate environment, in particular by changing their views, deterring them or neutralising them;
- aimed at the radical acts or words, in particular by making it impossible to commit these acts or utter/disseminate these words, and by disrupting or impeding activities;
- aimed at those who are affected by acts or words of radicalism, in particular by protecting them, increasing their assertiveness or reinforcing their bond with society.

Two pre-conditions for achieving this are exploring and observing malicious radicalism and achieving coherence in the various aspects of the approach, from the local level on up to the international level.

The statement was made that public organisations and individual citizens themselves have an important task in resisting radicalism and protecting the democratic legal order against threats. The Cabinet is aware that this will always require organisations and citizens to be suitably equipped. Under certain circumstances it will also require considerable personal courage. With the strategy presented in this memorandum the Cabinet therefore aims to provide optimum support to organisations, citizens and local authorities, in addition to its own efforts at combating radicalism and radicalisation. In order

to achieve these objectives, the existing instrumentarium will be expanded and the deployment thereof will be intensified.

The combating of radicalism and radicalisation therefore benefits from the adequate deployment and, in some cases, an expansion or intensification of instruments in a number of areas, from criminal law to civil law and from reinforcing the bond people have with society to fighting discrimination. It may be noted that the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice will jointly formulate a more clearly defined plan that will outline both the role of municipalities and police forces in respect of detecting and countering (Moslem) radicalism, and the possibilities and boundaries of criminal law and the judicial use of civil law in this context. As a result of the inter-ethnic incidents our country recently experienced and the alleged role played in these incidents by young rightwing extremists, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations recently also sent an AIVD memorandum to the municipalities relating to the role and backgrounds of these young people (c.f. Parliamentary documents II, 2004/05 29284, no. 12).

It would not be a good solution to make combating radicalism or radicalisation the main objective of policies in every policy area. This would quickly become counterproductive and could, as it were, stigmatise the policy area. It is more advisable for all the policy areas that are relevant to combating radicalisation and radicalism to use the framework presented in this memorandum in order to make a real contribution to a coherent approach. The Cabinet will encourage this coherence and effectiveness internally through regular consultations with the Ministers involved, and externally by giving direction to activities and measures for combating radicalism and radicalisation through consultations and collaboration with local authorities.

Malicious radicalism, of any nature, challenges the democratic constitutional state to its core, either by using – in extreme ways - the guarantees such a constitutional state offers to enable a multiform society, or by abusing these guarantees. However, neither the multiform society nor the democratic constitutional state are defenceless against such challenges. The important thing is to face the threat without being frightened, to resist it with good sense and determination and to always remember the ideal of a society in which everyone has room to develop to his or her full potential. This is not an easy task, and we will certainly not see results overnight. However, the way in which we face this challenge, both individually and jointly, will strongly determine the future of the society in which we all live.

6 Appendix: the current threat

In view of their philosophy and/or the proven willingness to use violence there are three forms of radicalism that currently demand special attention - even separately from concrete violent acts. These are Islamic radicalism, animal rights activism and right-wing radicalism. Other forms of radicalism, such as anti-globalism and left-wing radicalism are also acknowledged and explored on a regular basis but, based on today's insights, they do not constitute an active threat.

6.1 *General characteristics*

The radical philosophies of the aforementioned forms of radicalisation are, of course, all different. For those aspects relating to the threats and the approach to dealing with the form of radicalism in question the philosophy is no doubt relevant. In the concrete policy measures it will therefore certainly be taken into account. However, the previous chapters pointed out that it is not primarily the philosophy that characterises radicalism, but rather the way in which it is disseminated, which is why we do not take an in-depth look at the individual philosophies in this document. With regard to Islamic radicalism this has already been done in different reports. We specifically refer to the AIVD report '*Van Dawa tot Jihad*'. With regard to animal rights activism there is no actual recognisable underlying doctrine. The ideological backgrounds of participants in actions differ greatly - they come both from the extreme left and extreme right, but there are also some who have no specific political conviction. When it comes to the object of the activism the views also differ, from a (for the most part) emotional love for animals to a well-thought out legal dogma. In the case of right-wing radicalism there is no question of a coherent collection of ideas and views either, other than those among the very small category of neo-Nazis who have explicit national-socialist views and a somewhat larger group with more middle class right-wing views. In a larger group with right-wing radical views we mostly see the eclectic rehashing of old texts and opinions. These people rebel more against social developments in general; they have few clear ideas about a desired direction.

All three of the forms of radicalism discussed here have recently manifested themselves in a violent manner. Islamic radicalism and right-wing radicalism also invite counter-violence from other groups. The previous chapters have already highlighted types of threats that are separate from actual violence, as well as the risk of recruitment and provoking violence.

In each of the three aforementioned forms of radicalism there is a tendency to withdraw from civil authority. However, this is even more obvious in the radical Islam. Here this withdrawal is not just a means to an end; it is an end

in itself. Ideologically we can distinguish three steps in this process, each of which imply an attack on the democratic legal order, namely:

- the establishment of an autonomous Moslem community (umma) and consequently withdrawal of (the actions of) Moslems in secular states from the authority of the Government;
- the introduction of Islamic law (Shari'a) within this Moslem community;
- the establishment of the caliphate (a - global - theocracy based on Islam)

Accompanying or interim objectives in the realisation of this main objective may be damage to or the destruction of Israel, the United States and their allies or, more generally, creating as much damage as possible/taking as many human lives as possible (apocalyptic variant).

One aspect that makes the radical Islam particularly threatening is the fact that religious inspiration is linked to cross-border political objectives, whereby we can sometimes ask the question whether these political objectives result from the religious inspiration or whether the religion is mostly a means to mobilise support for the political goals. In the latter case the objectives that we have classed as accompanying or interim objectives are more likely to be the main objective. The link between religious and political objectives means that, on the one hand, there is an (indirect) connection with regimes in a number of Islamic countries that disseminate orthodox Islamic views through official media, religious leaders and religious texts but, on the other hand, also with movements that actively resist regimes in such countries. This international political aspect means that conflicts that have their origin outside our country have consequences here in the Netherlands. The religious aspect means that some supporters have a preference for suicide missions; furthermore, it promotes a (very) long-term perspective, which makes the traditional deterrents or repression methods less effective. Because of the religious aspect there is, furthermore, a sizeable category of persons who can relate to the philosophy.

This constitutes a qualitative change to the shape of the threat. Previously, the problems were mostly related to developments at a national level and nationally orientated persons and groups such as RaRa (*Revolutionist Anti-Racist Action*). Actions on the part of organisations like ETA (*Spanish Basque Liberation Front*), the IRA (*Irish Republican Army*), the RAF (*German Red Army Fraction*) etc. only occasionally touched the Netherlands, and collaboration between nationally operating groups was rare. Today however, radicalisation and the threats that come from outside the Netherlands and have their origin in ideologies that are based on religious or political ideologies that are not bound to territorial jurisdictions are also relevant. Such radicalism does affect the Netherlands, not because it concerns the Netherlands itself, but because

the Netherlands is in the middle of the relevant action zone. The Netherlands is part of the rich Christian West, Europe and NATO; in the Netherlands animals are exploited and genetically modified crops are grown; in the Netherlands there are people with the same political sentiments as in other countries. In short, radical activism can focus on the Netherlands because of something that is specific to the Netherlands or because of the coincidental presence of the activists in the Netherlands, but also because on the international scene the Netherlands stands for something that needs to be destroyed, the weakness of which must be demonstrated or the effective attack of which demonstrates the strength of the attacker and so increases the self-awareness.

These characteristics do not apply to animal rights activism and right-wing extremism, or do so to a lesser extent. The (accompanying and interim) objectives are less far-reaching and, although there is a certain international connection, there is no direct support from other nations. However, this does not mean it is any less important to combat these forms of radicalism; the necessity to do so is found in the fact that these forms of radicalism give cause for the use of violence.

6.2 *The radicals, their immediate environment and their breeding ground*

As mentioned previously, the elements of combating, obstruction and disruption focus mainly on the radicals and those in their immediate environment who provide them with (moral) support. It is difficult, at least in a general sense, to distinguish those who are open to being recruited or who radicalise independently (self-igniters) from the aforementioned radicals and their supporters.

The hard core of the **radical Islam**, the available information tells us, is relatively small (no more than several hundred persons). They constitute a threat because they are deemed capable of developing activities that can disrupt society. Such activities are not only violence, the threat of violence or incitement to violence, but also the radicalisation of others. They are always surrounded - among others through family relationships or ethnic or religious connections - by a number of people who provide them with active or passive support by sharing the radical views without taking action themselves or by making facilities available. This group of sympathisers is estimated to consist of several thousand people. There are indications that this group, or at least those who are sensitive to the more radical views because they share some of the ideas, is currently growing in size. This could also be a consequence of the fact that an increasing number of Dutch people of Turkish and Moroccan

origin experience the responses from politicians and from society as being aimed at Islam in general. Experience teaches us that certain groups have a higher risk of being radicalised or recruited (for instance young people, detainees, unemployed).

The number of strongly radicalised **animal rights activists** (hard core) may be an estimated several dozen, but the number of people who condone their actions or understand their actions (sympathisers) is considerably higher. Furthermore, the objectives of the animal rights movement are shared to a greater or lesser extent by several million people who do, however, disapprove of the use of violence (receptives). However, it is not possible to pinpoint a clearly defined category of persons who are at risk of being radicalised to the extent that they will become part of the hard core.

The **right-wing radical groups** are fairly limited in size. The number of (more or less organised) neo-Nazis is estimated to be no more than a hundred. The magnitude of the unorganised radical right is difficult to estimate but also appears to be limited.

One worrying phenomenon is the fact that, in addition to the known groups and networks, there also appear to be unstructured groups of mostly young people that establish themselves independently of these known groups. The existence of such groups has become very apparent in the period since November 2004; manifestations are arson in mosques and Islamic schools as well as threats against foreigners living in the Netherlands. The category of young people these groups and networks come from is virtually the same as the 'gabbers'^{*)} and comprises many thousands of people. Most analyses are unsure whether this category fully adopts the right-wing radical philosophy; it is estimated this is the case for no more than five percent. Young people who use the symbols, slogans and reasoning of right-wing radicalism in many cases do not do this because they have adopted the philosophy as such, but because they can recognise themselves in a particular issue or because they can use this issue as an excuse for strongly provocative actions, without having any real affinity with it. The latter situation also appears to occur among young people who disseminate elements of the radical Islamic philosophy. This does not change the fact that their utterances, because they take place in the context of radicalism, can easily be considered an indication that something is seriously wrong. That in itself may be a reason to act against this phenomenon. These groups also constitute a social problem because a lot of problems between ethnic and native youths centre around these groups. In terms of radicalism, these groups are a problem because their utterances are

^{*)} Note from translator: there is no English word to translate 'gabbers'. The closest may be 'jobbos'. Gabbers are young people who shave their heads and dress in tracksuits or bomber jackets. They enjoy 'hardcore' (extreme hip-hop music) and meet at all-night raves. They often have racist views. Not to be confused with neo-Nazis, who also shave their heads.

not mostly rejected by their parents as was the case in the early reforms of youth culture - quite the contrary, this category frequently appears to put the theory of their parents into practice.

Although these are three divergent groups, there are also similarities in the radicalisation process (see paragraph 3.2) and in the structure of and the communication within the radical groups. Radicalisation takes place both via targeted recruitment and in more or less autonomous processes. Young people in particular prove to be susceptible, certainly to the autonomous processes in which they reinforce each other's opinions and challenge each other, as it were, to come up with ever more radical ideas. Modern means of communication such as the Internet and mobile phones play a role in this process, but also the more traditional methods, such as written documents, music (lyrics) and television. The speed and distribution of the 'cut and paste' radicalism, whereby information and ideology are selectively taken apart and reassembled to match the person's own views, which are then distributed, appear to be a relatively new element.

This development can also be seen in the structure of and communication within radical groups. The Internet and mobile phones play an important role in this development, as does the autonomous operation and the cutting and pasting. This suits the frequently observed 'unstructured' configuration of the groups: they are networks rather than hierarchical organisations and, in part, even virtual networks of individuals who do not know each other personally but only meet via chat rooms etc. on the Internet.

For all three of these forms of radicalism there are also more structured organisations (parties) that disseminate the philosophy, but the groups that adopt (part of) the philosophy in question do not consider themselves part of these organisations as well. However, the influence of these groups can be considerable: they ensure the continuous availability of material on the Internet, in the media etc. It is also relevant that this dissemination, certainly via the Internet and television, is not limited to country borders.

6.3 *The communication channels*

Prevention and disruption partly take place by means of dealing with the communication channels that radicals use.

We have already discussed the fact that for all three of the aforementioned forms of radicalism, communication methods play an important role, both in

the communication within the group of radicals and communication with their environment and those they target. This applies particularly to the Internet and mobile telephony. It is typical of these methods that they impose hardly any restrictions on the user - and certainly no substantive restrictions -, have a broad reach and are virtually unmonitored. Incidentally, these advantages also apply - at least in part - to networks of people, even if the communication is entirely verbal. The main difference in this case is the speed, but for forms of radicalism with long-term goals this makes little difference.

One particular aspect of Islamic radicalism (or really of any religious radicalism) is the fact that the dissemination of the philosophy often takes place by means of - often ancient - texts of a religious nature. The problem with these kinds of texts is the fact that they may contain expressions of radicalism that, when considered in their historical context, can merely be found curious or objectionable but that have a completely different social effect if they are presented as being relevant - and even as a guideline - for life today. In this situation the rule applies that it is especially this addition of the person acting as the communication channel between the original text and today's audience on which the combating of radicalism must focus.

6.4 *Those affected and those threatened*

The methods of protecting, isolating and cohesion focus mainly on those who are affected or threatened by radicalism.

Each of the three forms of radicalism that are currently classified as being malicious constitutes, in itself, a threat to certain persons or groups of persons but, at the same time, increases the risk that persons associated with these forms of radicalism (may) become the victim of actions against these radicals. Those who are ultimately recruited by a radical group or who radicalise through an autonomous process are also affected by radicalism. As stated earlier, it is difficult to distinguish them, in a general sense, from what has previously been described as the radical environment, but they can also be found among those who are unjustly associated with radicals.

Animal rights activism usually targets objects (breeding farms for furred animals, research institutes etc.) but the proprietors and personnel of such establishments and, under certain circumstances, their family members are also at increased risk. The management and staff of the Biomedical Primate Research Centre in Rijswijk are clearly part of this high-risk category: there are regular demonstrations outside the Centre in which violence is also aimed at the possessions of those who work there.

Persons who may wrongly be associated with the activists are those who peacefully and democratically support animal causes.

In the circle of **Islamic radicalism**, persons who express criticism about Islam (certainly if they are or were Moslems themselves) are potentially at risk. Jews also have an increased risk because of the anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli character of a lot of the Islamic radicalism. In a way, however, Moslems themselves have a higher than average risk: not only do a number of radical Islamic views consider Moslems who are not themselves radicals as traitors of the cause and therefore a target for violence, when it concerns the objective of subjecting believers to a specific interpretation of Islam, they are also the ones who at least suffer from severe pressure from within the group. In areas where religious and cultural views are interwoven, women and girls have a particularly difficult position in this respect. They have an increased risk of becoming a victim of violence and suppression. In the latter case there may also be group pressure that need not come directly from the radicals, but that is reinforced by the radical message. It is clear that all Moslems are at risk of being associated with Islamic radicalism. To a certain extent this even applies to ethnic minorities in a general sense; they are at risk of being associated with religious or ethnically inspired radicalism as a result of stereotyping.

Also interwoven with Islamic radicalism, at present, is terrorism. It may be clear that the potential victims of a terrorist attack cannot be determined in advance. Neither do such attacks affect persons only. The past year has made it clear that certain buildings or hubs of passenger traffic (airports, railway stations) are also potential targets for terrorist attacks. Although the perpetrators of terrorist attacks usually act on the basis of radical motives, the point of application for combating such attacks is found primarily in the threat of these attacks. This approach forms part of the terrorism policy and is not further considered in the context of this memorandum.

From the **right-wing radical** side a number of threats against certain politicians have been issued in the past. The category of persons who are at risk of being threatened is considerably bigger: this category includes in any case persons who are (visibly) a part of an ethnic minority. Those who may potentially be wrongly associated with right-wing radicalism are in any case mostly persons who are part of the 'gabber culture'.